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L. A. No. 27435. In Bank. Jan. 19, 1965.]

MICHAEL B. MUGGILL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE
REUBEN H. DONNELLEY CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.
[1] ProC6ss-Service by Publication-Nonresidents.-Serviee of
summons by publication (Code Civ. Proe., §§ 412, 413) on nonresidents and a foreign corporation does not give the eourt
personal jurisdiction over them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 417.)
[2] Parties-Indispensable Parties.-In an action for declaratory
relief to establish the right to reinstatement in the employees'
retirement plan of defendant corporation, neither the tmstee,
a foreign corporation disbursing the retirement funds, nor the
members of the retirement committee administering the plan
were indispensable parties; an effective judgment, ordering
reinstatement nnder the plan and declaring unenforceable a
provision of the plan to terminate payments to a beneficiary
employed by a competitor of defendant eould be rendered
against defendant alone.
[3] Contracts-Legality-Contracts in Restraint of Trade.-Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 16600, declaring void contracts that restrain
anyone from engaging in a lawful trade or business, invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working for a competitor after eompletion of his
employment or imposmg a penalty if he does 80, unless such
provisions are necessary to protect the employer's trade
secrets.
[t] Id.-Legality-Contraets in Restraint of Trade.-A provIsion
of a corporate pension plan, which plan became part of the employment contract, that payments shall be suspended or terminated in the event any retired employee enters any occupation
or does any act which is in competition with any phase of the
business of his former employer restrained the retired employee from engaging in a lawful business and was void nnder
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16600, declaring contracts void that restrain anyone from engaging in a lawful trade or business.
P (1] Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Process, Notices, and Papers, § 56; Am.Jur.,
rocess (1st ed §§$3-77).
[2] Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Parties, § 4; Am.Jur., Parties (1st ed § 5) .
... raj Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Monopolies, Combinations, and Restraints of
.trade, § 5.

. Dig. References: [1] Process, § 33; [2] Parties, § 8; [3,4]
CoJ4eX
ntracts, § 66.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Angeles County. Arthur Crum, Judge. Reversed.

LoS

Action to determine plaintiff's right to reinstatement in a
retirement plan. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Eugene Kelly for Plaintiff and Appellant.
O'Melveny & Myers, Maynard J. Toll, Philip F. Westbrook, ..
Jr., and Richard E. Sllerwood for Defendant and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plainti1f appeals from an adverse judgment in an action for declaratory relief .to establish his
right to reinstatement in the employees' retirement plan of
defendant corporation.
Plainti1f left defendant's employ on JUly 1, 1960, after··
meeting all the requirements for benefits under the retirement
plan. On October 24, 1960, he went to work for a competitor
of defendant. On December 5, 1960, the retirement committee
that administers the plan notified plainti1f that his rights to
receive payments had been terminated pursuant to section 2
. of article five of the plan on the ground that he had entered
the employ of a competitor.1 Plaintiff then brought this
action against the corporation, the members of the retirement
committee, and the trustee that disburses the funds under
the plan, seeking a declaration that he was entitled to reinstatement on the ground that the section invoked by the retirement committee was against public policy and unenforceable. The trial court held that it was valid. The court also
held that the members of the retirement committee and the
trustee were indispensable parties (see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 389) over whom it had no jurisdiction. It therefore entered
judgment for the defendant.
[1] The trial court correctly concluded that it did not
have personal jurisdiction over the members of the retirement committee or over the trustee, a foreign corporation.
They were not residents of this st{lte, and plainti1f's service
of summons by publication (Code Civ. Proe., §§ 412,413) did
not give the court personal jurisdiction over them. (Code
Civ. Proc., §.417; see Atkinson v. Superior Oourt, 49 Ca1.2d
IThe aeetion provides: "The Annuity payments to any retired Em·
ployee shall be IUspended or terminated in the event such retired
Employee at any time enters any occupation or does any act which.
in the judgment of the Retirement Committee or of an Employer. u
in competition with any phase of the buain_ of any Employer."
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338, 346 [316 P.2d 960].) Section 417 does not preclude
securing personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation doing business in this state by service of process pursuant to
section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but since plaintiff
did not serve the trustee pursuant to that section, we need
not decide whether it was doing business in this state in acting
as trustee of a pension plan covering California employees.
[2] Plaintiff contends that the members of the committee
and the trustee are not indis!lensable parties. "A person
is an indispensable party to an _oon if his absence will prevent the court from rendering any effective judgment between the parties or would seriously prejudice any party
before the court or if his interest would be inequitably affected
or jeopardized by a judgment rendered between the parties."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 389.) Care must be taken to prevent this
rule of fairness in procedure from imposing a "burdensome
requirement which may thwart rather than accomplish justice." (Bank of California v. Superior Court, 16 Ca1.2d
516, 521 [106 P.2d 879].) If we were to hold that the committee members and the trustee were indispensable parties,
corporations could evade their obligations under retirement
plans merely by naming nonresidents as members of the
committee and as trustee. Indeed such a ruling would prevent
plaintiff from obtaining relief in this case.
Neither the trustee nor the committee members are indispensable parties. An effective judgment ordering plaintiff's
reinstatement under the plan and declaring section 2 of article
five unenforceable can be rendered against thc corporati!>n
alone
The retirement committee need not be separately joined
for an effective judgment. In suspending plaintiff the committee acted as an agent of the corporation, which holds the
Ultimate authority. The committee members, appointed by
the corporation, serve without compensation and at the pleasure of the corporation. A judgment against the corporation
effectively binds the committees that act on its behalf. Thus,
in an action to compel the declaration of dividends, a judgment against the corporation alone is effective, for the members of the boar4 of directors are not indispensable parties.
(Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 245 F.2d 609, 612; Kroesc
v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 763-765 [15
A.L.R.2d 1117], cert den. 339 U.S. 983 [70 8.Ct. 1026, 94
L.Ed. 1386]; Whittemore v. Conf1'ncntal Mills, 98 F.Supp.
387, 391 i contra, Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952,
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957-958, cert. den. 833 U.S. 875 [68 S. Ct. 905, 92 L.Ed.
1151].) Likewise, the president or secretary need not be.
joined in an action against the corporation to compel the
execution and delivery of a stock certificate. (Hertz v. Record Publishing Co., 219 F.2d 897, 400, cert. den. 349 U.S.
912 [75 S.Ct. 601, 99 L.Ed. 1247] ; see Tregear v. Etiwanda
Water Co., 76 Cal. 537 [18 P. 658, 9 Am.St.Rep. 245].)
Moreover, the corporation and the committee have concurrent
power to terminate payments under section 2 of article five
and, presumably, would also have concurrent power to reinstate.
Similarly, the trustee need not be separately joined. Under
the plan it merely disburses funds and does so "only at the
time, in the amount, and in the manner directed in written
directions received by the Trustee from the Retirement Committee." (Retirement Trust, article five.) A judgment affecting corporate policy would determine what the trustee will be
told, and it "may follow such instructions without question."
(Retirement Trust, article five.) We cannot presume that it
will refuse to do so.
We therefore find no justification for holding that the trustee or the committee members are indispensable parties. The
corporation, as the party before the court, will not be prejudiced by a judgment, since it has authority to control the
actions of the nonparties. Their interests will not be inequitably affected, because they have no personal interest at stake
and can safely follow the judgment. Accordingly, we reach
the merits.
[3] With certain exceptions not relevant here, section
16600 of the Business and Professions Code provides that
"every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging
in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to
that extent void." This section invalidates provisions in employment contracts prohibiting an employee from working
for a competitor after completion of his employment or imposing a penalty if he does so (Chamberlain v. Augustine, 172
Cal. 285, 288 [156 P. 479] ; Morris v. Harris, 127 Cal.App.2d
476,478 [274 P.2d 22] ; Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co., 300
F. 1, 4), unless they are necessary to protect the employer's
trade secrets (Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal.2d 690, 694 [321
P.2d 456]). [4] Since the pension plan becomes part of the
contract of employment (see Bas v. United States Rubber Co.,
100 CaI.App.2d 565, 568 [224 P.2d 386]), such provisions
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therein are also invalid. Thus, in Chamberlain v. Augustine,
supra, 172 Cal. 285, 288, which involved a sale of stock by a
retiring employee, this court held invalid an agreement to pay
liquidated damages to the purchasers if the employee worked
for a competitor. The court reasoned that the agreement
"imposes upon him a liability in the sum of five thousand
dollars if he does engage in such business. If the contract is
valid, he is not as free to do so as he would have been if he
were not bound by it. To the extent that the necessity of paying five thousand dollars deters him from engaging therein,
he would be restrained." Similarly, in this case, the provision
forfeiting plaintiff's pension rights if he works for a competitor restrains him from engaging in a lawful business and is
. therefore void. In view of the settled interpretation of section
16600, cases from other jurisdictions cited by defendant are
not persuasive.
The judgment is reversed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J.,
concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Ashburn in the opinion
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal (Muggill
v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (Cal.App.) 39 Cal.Rptr. 753).
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